SensorGuard-RV: Sensor-to-Register Data Protection for Resource-Constrained RISC-V Devices
AI Analysis Abstract SensorGuard-RV is a hardware-first approach designed to protect sensor measurements in resource-constrained embedded systems. It addresses vulnerabilities in the complex hardware-firmware stack by delivering sensor samples directly into processor registers…
AI Analysis
Abstract
SensorGuard-RV is a hardware-first approach designed to protect sensor measurements in resource-constrained embedded systems. It addresses vulnerabilities in the complex hardware-firmware stack by delivering sensor samples directly into processor registers without trusting intermediate software, communication buses, or memory. After initial configuration, a write-once ownership switch transfers control of the sensor to a fixed-function controller, which performs hardware-level authenticated encryption on samples using a software-inaccessible key. A new RISC-V instruction then decrypts the sample and writes it to a register only after verifying its cryptographic tag and rejecting replays, including those across system resets. The authors implemented SensorGuard-RV on a NEORV32 core with an ADXL362 SPI accelerometer on an Artix-7 FPGA. Their experiments show that at 100 MHz, a protected sample reaches a register in 5,191 cycles (51.9 µs), with the two Ascon authenticated encryption engines accounting for 30 cycles. The fixed-function acquisition eliminates per-byte software polling, allowing the protected loop to sustain 19,015 transactions/s, which is 5.3% faster than a software-driven SPI baseline. The added logic, primarily the Ascon engine, consumes 3,155 LUTs and 2,215 registers (5.0% and 1.7% of the device, respectively) and preserves the 100 MHz clock frequency, while estimated power increases from 118 mW to 368 mW.
Key Highlights
- Introduces SensorGuard-RV, a hardware-first approach for sensor-to-register data protection in RISC-V embedded systems.
- Achieves sensor data authenticity, confidentiality, and replay rejection by removing intermediate software, buses, and memory from the trusted path.
- Implements a write-once ownership switch and a fixed-function acquisition controller for exclusive sensor access and hardware-level authenticated encryption.
- Develops a new RISC-V instruction (AUDEC) for authenticated decryption and conditional register writeback, verifying tags and rejecting replays.
- Demonstrates, through authors' experiments, a protected sample delivery latency of 5,191 cycles (51.9 µs) at 100 MHz, with cryptographic operations taking 30 cycles.
- Reports a sustained throughput of 19,015 transactions/s, which is 5.3% higher than a software-driven SPI baseline, due to optimized hardware acquisition.
- The added hardware logic, dominated by Ascon engines, consumes 3,155 LUTs and 2,215 registers (5.0% and 1.7% of the Artix-7 FPGA device) and maintains the 100 MHz clock.
Technical Details
- SensorGuard-RV employs a hardware-first architecture with a write-once ownership switch (HW2) to grant exclusive sensor access to a fixed-function acquisition and protection wrapper (HW1).
- The system integrates two Ascon-128a authenticated encryption engines: one in HW1 for encryption during acquisition and another in the Custom Functions Unit (CFU) for decryption.
- A new RISC-V instruction, AUDEC, is introduced to the NEORV32 processor, enabling authenticated decryption of sensor packets and conditional writeback to a register only after successful tag verification and replay rejection.
- Security relies on hardware-held keys and a per-boot 96-bit epoch (E) combined with a 32-bit sequence number (s) to form a 128-bit nonce for Ascon-128a, ensuring replay protection across resets.
- The authors' implementation on a NEORV32 core with an ADXL362 SPI accelerometer on a Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA operates at a 100 MHz system clock and approximately 1.04 MHz SPI clock.
- Experimental results by the authors indicate that a protected sample reaches a register in 5,191 cycles (51.9 µs), with the two Ascon engines contributing 30 cycles to this latency.
- The system achieves a sustained throughput of 19,015 transactions/s, which the authors report as a 5.3% improvement over a software-driven SPI baseline's 18,057 transactions/s.
- The added hardware logic for SensorGuard-RV, including the Ascon engines, ownership switch, acquisition controller, and packet registers, consumes 3,155 LUTs and 2,215 registers, representing 5.0% and 1.7% of the target FPGA device, respectively.
- The authors' estimated power consumption for the full system rises from a baseline of 118 mW to 368 mW, an increase of 250 mW (211.9%), while maintaining the 100 MHz operating frequency.
Implications
- SensorGuard-RV significantly enhances the security of sensor data in resource-constrained embedded systems by providing hardware-enforced authenticity, confidentiality, and replay protection from the sensor to the processor register.
- The design substantially reduces the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) for sensor data acquisition and delivery by making intermediate software, buses, and memory untrusted components.
- By moving the decision to release a verified sample into hardware, the system mitigates risks associated with software vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and malicious access to the data path.
- The performance benefits, such as higher throughput compared to a software-driven baseline, suggest that enhanced security can be achieved without sacrificing, and potentially improving, acquisition efficiency for fixed workloads.
- This approach is particularly relevant for cyber-physical systems (CPS) where the integrity and trustworthiness of sensor data are critical for safe and correct operation, such as in flight controllers or industrial control processes.
Limitations
- The prototype's DMA controller is disabled, requiring software to copy packets, and while a controlled DMA could transfer encrypted packets, CFU loading still requires processor instructions.
- The current design does not support runtime sensor reconfiguration or protection of computations on the sensor's output, requiring modifications for more flexible access policies.
- Multiple consumers would need to serialize access to the shared CFU context, and the single last-accepted sequence register supports only one sensor stream.
- Key provisioning is fixed in the FPGA configuration; a deployment would require secure key management mechanisms like bitstream encryption or PUF-derived keys.
- The authors did not perform board-level power measurements or a side-channel evaluation, and the fixed-latency comparison does not inherently guarantee resistance to timing or other side-channel attacks.
- Physical attacks on the sensor or board, compromised FPGA configurations, fault injection, and key extraction are explicitly out of the defined security scope.
- The prototype holds only one four-byte accelerometer packet at a time, and supporting multiple sensors or larger payloads would require significant architectural extensions, including per-source acquisition front ends, bounded queues, authenticated metadata, and multi-block cryptographic support.
- The system does not currently bound the time at which an old sample can be released, only its sequence order, meaning delayed readings are not rejected.
- The implementation has not undergone formal verification, unlike some related systems.
Source: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08380